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A l'instar des generaw, les journalistes sont toujours les combattants de la 
derniere guerre. Les mouvements pour la paix sont reprknt6s comme &ant 
deviants. La responsabilie incombe aux chercheurs de formuler un discours 
altematif sur la paix. Leur methodologie doit devenir plus communicative 
tout en enjoignant une plus grande participation. 
Credibility, the central concept of communication theory and implicit in all 
its paradigms, is best understood by examining its limits; that is, the denial 
of reality. Two cases are studied here: the European holocuast and Vietnam 
revisionism. The former is framed by two documentary films, Leni 
Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will and Claude Lanzmann's Shoah; the latter 
by the CBS TV special "The Uncounted Enemy." A "worst case scenario" 
suggests that Vietnam revisionism is part of a larger strategy to persuade a 
public that a nuclear war is winnable. Current coverage of the Middle East 
is seen as an example of World War I11 being seen through the eyes of World 
War I1 as journalists and other interpreters are unable to transcend their own 
occupational subculture and experience in covering foreign policy leadership 
(The Diplomatic Correspondent syndrome) and military engagements (The 
Foreign Correspondent syndrome). Like Generals, journalists are always 
fighting the last war. Peace movements are represented as deviant and serve 
to enhance the credibility of war movements. They are like the images of 
women in the androcentric discourse of our dominant culture. Responsibility 
for an alternative peace discourse, then, rests with researchers whose 
methodology must become more communicative and participatory. 
The Problem of "Credibility" 
Canadian communications studies have come a long way in a very short time. I gave 
my first paper on communications at the Learneds in a session of Political Science, 
and when I set up a course at York on Social Theory and the Mass Media of 
Communication in 1%4--prehistory-it was the only course in the country and 
regarded as typically American. I hastily renamed it the Sociology of Knowledge 
which gave it a certain European panache and legitimacy. 
Although we have grown and flourished as an academic community, we have not 
had much impact on public policy. There are some distinguished exceptions, among 
them John Meisel, Liora Salter, Fred Fletcher, "GiGi" Robinson and Tom McPhail. 
2 The Texts of War and the Discourse of Peace/T. McCormack 
But all of them have come out of other disciplines. We still have to earn our status as 
a distinctive discipline. 
Even within academe the perception of us is confused. The people in Humanities 
think we're "number crunchers", and the "number crunchers" think we're qualitative; 
the phenomenologists think we're positivists, and the positivists think we're 
phenomenologists. The administration thinks we're Marxists, and the Marxists think 
we are a branch of "Admin" studies. We seem to float without a fixed place or a body 
of knowledge. 
But 1988 may be our historic moment. The new Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and particularly Section 2(b) of the Constitution, is part of Canada's Quiet Revolution 
which began in Quebec but has spread across the country in both directions. Canadian 
political culture of 1988 is post-Lassage, post-Uvesque, post-Pkquiste, a strange mix 
of elements-Francophone and Anglophone, East and West, male and female, work- 
ing-class and middle-class, farmer and factory worker- but it is different. In 1988, 
we are also part of the Soviet Union's Glasnost and Perestroika which people are 
beginning to call the Second Russian Revolution. 
There is a connection between these two revolutions, for when the Charter and 
Glasnost, are juxtaposed, when they are placed side-by-side, they are complementary, 
two sides of the same coin. The Charter deals with rights; Glasnost, with process; the 
first with the state, the second with society; the first with dissent, the second with 
tolerance. The first with langue, the second with parole. And it is in that space between 
langue andparole, state and society, rights and process that we can situate communica- 
tion and our agenda. 
Compared to many of the Western democracies, Canada appreciates freedom 
more than tolerance. Bill C-54 which deals with the censorship of pornography is a 
case in point. Closer to Stalinism than Voltaire-ism, the legislation would make Canada 
the most culturally repressive country of the Western democracies. Yet not many 
Canadians have protested C-54, and I think it is indicative of a more general distrust 
of culture. I have been more puzzled, however, by the silence of our university-based 
experts on culture and communication who as a collectivity have said nothing about 
the Bill, nothing about the behaviorist research on which it is based, and the political 
pressures that have led to it. Do we have nothing to say on these issues? If our 
knowledge and expertise do not give us any special authority in this area, how can we 
expect to be taken seriously? Our credibility as a professional community of scholars 
is also , then, located between rights and process, between the Constitution and 
Glasnost. 
I am going to talk about communication and credibility: the credibility of the 
media and of our research. I am particularly interested in the limits of credibility, at 
what point it disintegrates or fails and we respond to reality by denying it. Denial has 
become the distinguishing characteristic of our modem psychohistory, and the 
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holocaust is a prime example. I am going to frame my comments on this phenomenon 
by comparing two documentary films: Leni Riefenstahl's Tn'umph of the Will and 
Claude Lanzmam's Shah.  
I am also going to talk about the current emphasis in our media on war texts. Viet- 
nam revisionism is one of these texts, and in my opinion, a very crucial one. For it is 
my belief that the strategic theorists are moving toward the idea of a nuclear war as 
winnable, and to make that case Vietnam must be seen in a different light. For pur- 
poses of that discussion I am going to look at a CBS documentary called "The Un- 
counted Enemy" which is an example of Vietnam revisionism. The program was also, 
you may recall, the subject of a big libel suit filed by General Westmoreland. And I'll 
have a few things to say about libel suits and the media's near hysteria about them. 
The alternative to war texts is peace discourse. The problem with media coverage 
of the peace movement is not neglect but patronizing attitudes. The movement is seen 
through the eyes of macho reporters and editors whose careers have been spent cover- 
ing the military. 
Finally, I want to talk about us and the way we do our research. Most of us are 
not practicing journalists, broadcasters or film makers. We are observers of them, spec- 
tators who study what others say and do. Media people like to think they set the politi- 
cal agenda; they don'c they only think they do which is their peculiar occupational 
hubris. At best, they are parties in what I have called agenda-negotiating (McCormack, 
1983). 
The problem is that too often they set our agenda. Indirectly, they determine what 
we study, the texts we deconstruct. And although we may bring a critical perspective 
to this, we are not, as I think we must become, the conscience of the media. The na- 
ture of criticism itself cannot be assumed. The critical act itself needs to be under- 
stood. As Michael Walzer says, "critical distance is measured in inches" (Walzer, 
1987). 
The Meaning of "Communication 
"What do we mean by "communication?" At the present time we tend to borrow our 
understanding of communication from other sources, from Marxist theories of 
ideology, literary criticism, linguistics, psychoanalytic psychology, symbolic 
interaction, semiotics, structuralism and post-structuralism, and Radical Feminism, 
from German phenomenology, Frankfurt critical theory, French existentialism, and 
British analytic theory. We are either the most powerful scholars in the twentieth 
century or the most dilletante depending on how you look at it. But either way it is an 
impressive intellectual background, long on theorizing and weak on empirical 
verification, rich in speculation but poor on methodological rigour. 
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None of these various schools of thought really address the meaning of com- 
munication. We are still just stalking the prey. Communication theory is its own 
domain with its own conceptual systems and frameworks, its own competing inter- 
pretations of its shared obse~ations, and its own methods. It is not a child conceived 
through in-vitro fertilization, not a subset of one of our established disciplines or 
philosophical orientations although it helps to be knowledgeable about several of them 
and expert in, at least, one. 
Communication is an interactive process through which we achieve a consensual 
validation. The cornerstone of any communication theory is the concept of credibility, 
and until we can elaborate and specify what we mean by credibility, we have no theory 
of communication. 
To understand credibility, however, we must look beyond its psychological mean- 
ing to its societal contexts. What image do we have of society? Our current paradigms 
are based on three quite different models. They are, very briefly, a cybernetic or sys- 
tems model with an emphasis on cognitive processes, on information and problem- 
solving; a cultural model with an emphasis on motivation, on the production of 
meaning and the achievement of collective identity; and a conflict model in which 
communication is ideological expression, an instrument of a class in the process of so- 
cial change. (McCormack, 1986) Each of these paradigms has its own heuristic 
strength, but the issue of credibility is central to all of them. 
Credibility also depends critically on a political-historical environment. We may 
look at texts, l'kcrits as if they were self-contained, as if they were closed and com- 
plete systems within themselves, and we can examine their dramaturgical strategies 
and make inferences about them. But we do so at our own risk for texts come to life, 
they breathe and acquire credibility, as Habermas understood, through social action. 
One example of a truly great, superb act of communication in our time was Martin 
Luther King Jr.'s "I have a Dream" speech. (McCormack, 1982) It is still in 1988 a 
very moving speech, and if you are Black it is the equivalent of Lincoln's Gettysburg 
address. But King's speech was willed into being by a civil rights movement. The Lin- 
coln Memorial in Washington, D.C. July of 1968 happened to be the moment. We can, 
I think, extrapolate from that to say that when we look at communication we are look- 
ing at social movements. 
Communication and the Nazi Movement 
National Socialism in Germany was the social movement that led to World War 11. In 
1934 Leni Riefenstahl was commissioned by Hitler to make a film which has become 
one of the great classics of modem art propaganda (Furhammar, Isaksson, 1971). The 
title Tn'umph of the Will was, Riefenstahl tells, us Hitler's own suggestion. It was about 
a Party rally of the National Socialist Party Congress held in Nurenberg; (Nurenberg 
because Hitler's strength was greater there than in Berlin.) Thus the audiences 
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wherever it was shown believed it was seeing a real event, not a staged dramatization. 
The film, carefully scripted, was intended to capture the true spirit of the new Nazi 
Germany and the echt Deutsch soul of the German people. Its imagery is brilliant from 
the opening shots when we see Hitler's plane descending through the skies, arriving, 
as Taylor said, like Lenin at the Finland station (Taylor, 1979). The film emphasizes 
the masses and their discipline, their devotion to Der Fuhrer, and their unity (labour, 
youth, the army and SS.) There is one extraordinary scene where Hitler is consecrating 
the battle flags. He touches each as if he had a mystical power to raise the dead. No 
matter how often I've seen this film I am always caught up in that moment and for a 
fraction of a second become a "true believer." It is easy to slide sequentially from the 
flag scene to the final climactic speech by Hess, "The Party is Hitler, But Hitler is 
Germany, just as Germany is Hitler. Sieg Heil." Thus there is a synchronic logic. 
Throughout the film there is only one passing reference to race: "A people that 
does not preserve its racial purity must perish". Otherwise there is no mention of anti- 
Semitism. Nor is there any reference to a Left~ommunist  and Socialist--opposi- 
tion. A weak powerless Germany, a humiliated people who saw Triumph of the Will 
was transformed in their own imaginations to a proud nation with an historic destiny. 
Riefenstahl did far more for the Third Reich than Nietzsche, but neither the film nor 
the government could have been as effective without the intellectual underpinning of 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche, however, is not banned in Germany today; Triumph of the Will 
is. 
The other Germany was either lost or subordinated into some kind of anti-Com- 
munist and Aryan mystique, so that when the first German refugees came over in the 
1930s they said, "You don't know what is happening". What they meant, in part, was 
that they did not understand, for the parameters of it were beyond their comprehen- 
sion as well as ours. They read into our eyes their own disbelief. And, indeed, it 
remained a phenomenon that eluded our imaginations and our capacity to make sense 
of i t  So, too, the judges at Nuremberg were just as incredulous. "There is less of a 
mental barrier in accepting the weirdest stories of supernatural phenomena as, for ex- 
ample, water running uphill and trees with roots reaching to the sky. than in taking at 
face value these narratives which go beyond the frontiers of human cruelty and 
savagery" (Masrms, 1987: 159). 
But those early refugees believed naively that we were a tough-minded pragmatic 
people who wanted information and would act on it. Later, and with infinitely greater 
bitterness and truth, they said, "You don't know and you don't want to know." It was 
this accusation of denial and indifference which engendered a guilt which has haunted 
modem intellectuals who had explored their own unconscious enough to know or 
suspect it was true. The liberal mind shaped by the 18th century and barely able to 
balance John Stuart Mill with Freud and Marx was overwhelmed by this introspective 
nightmare. Even persons who had fled the pogroms of Eastern Europe and carried in 
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their memories Czarist atrocities did not comprehend it, for the stet1 cruelty of East- 
em Europe was feudal, pre-modern Europe, not Germany, not Weimar. 
Triumph of the Will-its message, its style, its aesthetic- be contrasted with 
Claude Lanzmann's Shoah where the denial of genocide is painfully forced out into 
the open and confronted. The difference between the two documentaries constitutes a 
chapter in our modem political cultural history. But between the beginning and the 
end was nearly half a century of believing and disbelieving. 
In her remarkable study of how the media covered the holocaust, Deborah Lisptadt 
documents the inability of media to confront what they saw and knew was happening 
(Lipstadt, 1986). The American press was not on the side of Hitler, but they were not 
on the side of the Jews either, and many of their publishers might have thought the 
Nazis preferable to the Communists. But they could not comprehend the gas cham- 
bers, the death camps, the forced evacuation of millions of people who had done noth- 
ing. Auschwitz was, she said, Beyond Belief. 
Yet, from time to time the correspondents in Germany and Eastern Europe did 
grasp the politics of the Nazi movement; that is, the leadership of Hitler and the Na- 
tional Socialist Movement. And they created another myth. The Final Solution wasn't 
the German people; it was their leaders. Once the party was defeated, Germany would 
be forgiven and return to us, to the fold of Enlightenment democracies, to the civiliza- 
tion of Goethe not Wagner. 
One consequence of this myth that Nazi Germany was an aberration was another 
form of denial by Canadian officials who could have opened the doors of Canada to 
refugees. Failure to do so made us complicit, a party of the holocaust. (Imagine Canada 
if we had gotten Einstein!) (Abella and Troper, 1982). Had the press, Lipstadt writes, 
"been willing to build on the information which had been steadily emerging over the 
past twelve years, there would have been little reason for 'surprise'. But the press was 
never able to see the full picture, even when it had many, if not all, of the details in 
hand." 
It could not admit to itself or to its readers that these stories were the truth. 
Often, instead of explicitly rejecting the news as exaggerated, it simply put 
a critically important story on the comic page or next to the weather report. 
It put blinders on and erected all sorts of baniers which made it more rational 
for readers to disbelieve than believe. (Lipstadt, 1986, p. 271-272. Italics 
mine.) 
The British press, she tells us, was better. Was this because they were closer to Europe 
and understood it better? Or was it because their readers were more political? Or that 
Europeans, in general, were less naive about the nature of good and evil? George 
h e l l  who spoke disparagingly of the "imbecile optimism of the Tory press" probably 
thought there was no difference. The Soviet press also carried reports of the 
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deportations of Jews, but American journalists were too shrewd to trust anything 
datelined Moscow, and they were equally skeptical of information from Jewish 
sources. 
But the horror goes further. Some years ago I was involved in a study at the Allen 
Memorial hospital in Montreal on stress: the senile psychoses and stress. This was one 
of those ambitious multi-disciplinary studies--a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and others. 
I was the sociologist who had the responsibility of drawing up a life history question- 
naire. The head of the project was a Czech refugee: brilliant, wise, literate, a scientist 
with a humanist's understanding of the human condition. Nevertheless, we had a great 
deal of trouble defining "stress". So after weeks of frustrating discussion we decided 
that we would take home a group of case histories and rate them using whatever defini- 
tion of stress we wanted. On Monday morning the director picked up one of mine to 
which I had given a plus four, maximum stress. 
"Why", he said, "did you do that?" 
"Well," I replied, "this man was in a concentration camp; he didn't know from 
day to day whether he would live or die; he was separated from his family. He had no 
idea of where his wife and children were and whether they were alive or dead. I think 
that is maximum stress." 
"Don't be ridiculous," he said. "That man was in an Italian concentration camp. 
They had wine; they had haircuts. I was in Dachau." 
I was stunned; first, by the personal revelation and then, gradually. by the realiza- 
tion of the mental state we were in if we are sitting there like characters out of Kafka 
comparing the relative merits of concentration camps. The holocaust had now, like 
disease, destroyed the tissue of our values. Nothing in my family experience, nothing 
in my education, nothing in my life had prepared me for the morality of ranking con- 
centration camps, of making fine distinctions between Dachau and an Italian con- 
centration camp. It was "beyond belief." 
The success of the neo Nazi movement lies in our innocence, our selfdeception 
about their claim that the holocaust did not exist. You and I are not likely to believe it; 
we are too close to it, but we should not have any illusions about future generations. 
Jim Keegstra and Ernst Zundel may well succeed not because they are clever 
propagandists or super manipulato~s-they are both inept and appeal to the semi- 
literate-but because of our failure of nerve, our trahison des clercs; we want to for- 
get the holocaust. 
The media in Toronto took pride in the fact that they gave almost no attention to 
the recent Zundel trial, depriving Zundel of a forum and martyrdom. But if you look 
closely at the coverage of Israel in our own media (our own media is somewhat of a 
fiction since the major coverage of the Middle East is by the U.S. wire services) there 
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is a much more subtle denial of any connection between the holocaust and the State 
of Israel. Leaving aside the possibility of contrived footage of children throwing 
stones, what are we to make of a headline in the Washington Post which reads, "Is- 
raelis Jubilant at Killing." (Manchester Guardian, 1988, p. 17) Whoever wrote that 
headline is what Leslie Fiedler would call one of the "new mutants". I am under no 
illusions about the state of Israel and its relationship to its Arab population. Occupa- 
tion corrupts, and absolute occupation corrupts absolutely, but occupation does not 
turn a people into sadists. 
I don't want to stop here and discuss the media coverage of the Middle-East, 
whether there is too much or too little, whether it is pro-Arab or pro-Israel. Or why. I 
accept the view of several observers that (1) there is too much of it and that it receives 
disproportionately more coverage than other more newsworthy stories; and (2) there 
has been a shift from pro-Israel to pro-Arab sympathy. I suspect both trends have more 
to do with a world-wide oil crisis than a resurgence of anti-Semitism or the propagan- 
da efforts of the P.L.O. (Emerson, 1986P). Like Neil Kressel, I question the useful- 
ness of that kind of content analysis. (Kressel, 1987) And I share Robert Hackett's 
critique of objectivity as a journalistic norm(Hackett, 1984). The point I want to make 
is that the media have taken the old template of Nazi Germany and reversed the cast: 
the children of survivors are the storm troopers; the victims of racism become the 
racists. By this strange inversion the holocaust and the concept of "survivors" cease 
to exist and no longer have any claim on our historical conscience. Thus, that long 
legacy of Judeo-Christian guilt is suspended temporarily. It is a strange and bitter fruit. 
What we see on television every night in Lebanon or Gaza or the West Bank is 
World War I11 through the eyes of World War 11. There is the same Foreign Correspon- 
dent syndrome which emphasizes the military action; and there is the familiar 
Diplomatic Correspondent syndrome which focuses on officials and government 
policies. But there is a contradiction, for within these conventions which were created 
and honed in World War I1 the issues have been de-Europeanized and emotionally dis- 
tanced as if the Middle East was disconnected from us, from our knowledge, our ex- 
perience, from our past; as if it was aregional, not a global, dispute between two strange 
parties each of whom can elicit our xenophobic responses. They are "other", 
Utranger. Middle East media coverage is, as military history, one war behind; as 
political history, it is bereft, ahistorical. It is concrete where it should be metaphorical 
and metaphorical where it should be explicit No wonder we become desensitized to 
it since it lacks the matrix of values and history that would give it a meaning. 
In her study of the media and the holocaust, Deborah Lipstadt (1986) does not 
mention the people who were doing research on the media in this period, many of 
whom were themselves refugees. They were, in fact, analyzing Nazi propaganda for 
it was the war and its outcome that preoccupied them. Many, of course, hoped to return 
to their homes, and winning the war was more important to them than understanding 
Fascism or persuading apolitical North Americans to think politically. Then, as now, 
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we turn less believable political states of mind into more believable forms of action, 
and political events into military ones since they are easier to circumscribe and under- 
stand. In addition, as several scholars have noted, the television camera is inevitably 
drawn to hard action, to do-ers rather than thinkers. Todd Gitlin, you may recall, 
described how the media turned the New Left from a political movement into an anti- 
war movement (Gitlin, 1980). Alice Cook and Gwyn Kirk describe media coverage 
of the Women's Encampment in Britain (Greenham Common) as similarly biased. The 
media were not, they say, interested in the cause but in the physical appearances and 
lifestyles of the women, not interested in the nonviolence but in arrests (Cook, Kirk, 
1983). These distortions are not inherent in the medium, but the television medium 
exaggerates further the stylistics of the existing discourse. 
There is a parallel today with Chile where our media and our media researchers 
have distanced themselves h m  the Pinochet government and the social groups who 
support it, where it is, as Lipstadt says, more rational to disbelieve than believe. There 
are a handful of people in Santiago who are studying the media. But apart from Claudio 
Duran, who else studies the Chilean press and the strategies it uses to normalize the 
unthinkable? 
If the Nazi era began, as Kracauer suggests, with The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari and 
reached its symbolic apotheosis in Triumph of the Will, it ends with Shah and the 
morbid cabinets of the sealed trains in which people were transported to the death 
camps (Kracauer, 1947). The contrast between Triumph of the Will and Shoah could 
not be more compelling. There are no staged spectacles in Shoah, no Wagnerian music, 
no uniforms and massed rituals. The settings are a quiet landscape, an empty park, a 
river in the background. We are told it is the route which the trains took, but it looks 
to the viewer like the tabula rasa; it is in this setting where people are asked relive 
their trauma. Only at the end of the nine hours does the film become more dramatic 
as we hear of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising and its defeat Otherwise, the film makes 
no concessions to our need for narrative, suspense or climax. It is the anti-aesthetic 
that breaks with the conventional documentary form to achieve an authenticity about 
the unthinkable. From that perspective Shah is to the modem documentary film what 
Picasso was to art; its aesthetics are those of Guernica. And just as Guernica il- 
luminated the violence of the Spanish Civil War, Shah confronts us with the cogni- 
tive dimensions of the holocaust that were so dissonant in the past. Claude Lanzmann, 
the producer and interviewer of Shoah, was not a therapist skillfull in peeling back the 
layers of selfdeception; he was an intellectual, a friend of Same's. The concreteness 
of Shah, the exhaustiveness of it give the film an existentialist voice beneath the 
voices of the speakers, and that, I suggest, is why it is credible to a generation that 
lived in an existentialist frameaf-reference. It was the perfect match between genre 
and audience. 
Shah has no formal script. On the surface it consists of nothing more than a series 
of interviews with survivors, former camp functionaries, members of the Polish 
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underground, people who lived in the villages where the camps were located. The in- 
terviews are very slow as the questions and answers are translated laboriously from 
one language to another: French, Polish, Hebrew, English. And Lanzmann is a very 
direct and inquisitional type of interviewer. The pace of the film is also very slow, al- 
most slow-motion with long stretches when nothing is said and nothing happens so as 
to suggest the nonlinearity of the structure. We and the camera keep returning to the 
scenes of the camps with anumbing redundancy. Thus Shoah has a credibility that our 
tighter, more overproduced Fifth Estate or NFB documentaries lack. Shoah, like his- 
tory itself, has no closure. S h a h  also provides the evidence of denial. To take just 
one example: 
Aprisoner on the 'special detail' saw a women in the 'undressing room' who 
was the wife of a friend of his. He came right out and told her: 'You are going 
to be exterminated. In three hours you'll be ashes.' The woman believed 
him because she knew him. She ran aLl over and warned the other women., 
'We're going to be killed. We're going to be gassed.' Mothers carrying their 
children on their shoulders didn't want to hear that. They decided the woman 
was crazy. They chased her away, So she went to the men. To no avail. Not 
that they didn't believe her, they'd hear rumors in the Bialystok ghetto or in 
Grodno and elsewhere. But who wanted to hear that! When she saw that no 
one would listen, she scratched her whole face. Out of despair. In shock. 
And she started to scream (Lanzmann, 1985, p. 126) 
Victims of the holocaust said they couldn't remember, and Polish bystanders said they 
didn't know what was going on a few kilometers outside of their village. Lanzmann, 
at times, pushing his interviewees forced some of them to remember. 
I watched Shoah several times each time becoming more fascinated by it. 
Grotesque and tragic as the stories were, I didn't shed a tear. I still don't understand 
why it affected me so powerfully intellectually and so weakly at the level of sentiment. 
Others I have talked to have had similar reactions; they expected the pathos of The 
Diary of Anne Frank, not the making of an historical record. But although the film 
failed to reach me on an emotional level, it touched all of the sensitive nerves of an 
intellectual biography so that when not long ago Kurt Waldheim's memory failed him 
about his Nazi past, I was prepared; I felt I had already met Kurt Waldheim in 
Lanzmann's film. Future generations whose life experiences may be less characterized 
by the equations of the existential mood of our era may find in Shoah something very 
different just as they will in La Nausea and the myth of Sisyphus, but I do not think 
the holocaust will disappear from living history as long as S h a h  is available, for S h a h  
is the death, not of Fascism, but of the credibility of Triumph of the Will. 
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The Rhetoric of War and Peace 
Shah belongs to World War 11; Vietnam is World War I11 and, it too, was covered by 
correspondents who had learned their trade either in World War II or by others who 
had been there. My Lai which Seymour Hersh made into the war crime of the Vietnam 
war was a reminder of the dehumanization of the death camps. And My hi, together 
with the revelations of the Pentagon Papers was important in the eventual withdrawal 
of U.S. "advisers". 
Neither of these, however, is an image of the version of Vietnam we are getting 
today. Popular films like Platoon and Rarnbo are war films, action fdms with macho 
values. Their message is that Vietnam was a noble and unnecessary defeat. The Green 
Berets, The Deer Hunter (which ends in a bathetic scene of everyone singing "God 
Bless America"), Taxi Driver, Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Rambo, Good Morning, Viet- 
nam are just a few of the Hollywood films which celebrate the American way of life 
and the American soldier over the South East Asians, that is, an enemy Communist 
force. Most of these films are racist, jingoistic, and "macho"; they are not about the 
Vietnam of anti-war demonstrations, of draft evaders coming to Canada, of young 
people burning their draft registration cards. Vietnam is the excuse for films whose 
appeal to a teenage audience is danger, excitement, growing-up, death and inter-per- 
s o d  loyalty. The formulae are well-researched and the films differ only in their 
thematic emphasis. But the Vietnam of a divided America is not there. 
Among strategic theorists, however, the issue is not to convert the generation that 
opposed Vietnam, but to deny the reality of defeat in Vietnam. They do not speak to 
a generation that opposed the presence of American advisers in Vietnam, but to those 
who are disillusioned by the experience, who went expecting to triumph over an evil 
empire of Asian communists, and returned with those forces in fm control. Vietnam 
revisionism legitimates the war but questions its leadership. 
It defines Vietnam as a military engagement not a political war and argues that it 
could have and should have been won. It was lost, according to the military, because 
Congress failed to provide the personnel and material. But according to the CIA, it 
was lost because of the ineptitude of the military who failed to understand the ideologi- 
cal aspects of the war. Congress blames the media which manipulated public opinion. 
Each locates culpability somewhere else, but they are agreed that the defeat was a dis- 
grace that could have been avoided. 
It was the CIA'S interpretation, the second view which held the military respon- 
sible for the defeat that CBS made into a 90 minute documentary called "The Un- 
counted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception." The program, drawing on same format as 60 
Minutes and narrated by Mike Wallace, was a joint product of Sam Adams, a former 
CIA analyst and George Crile a CBS television producer. It was Adams's story based 
on his own analysis of statistics that both the CIA and the military were engaged in a 
cover-up, an attempt to underestimate the number of civilian Vietnamese who were 
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helping the =etcong. According to Adarns and the program, the motive behind the 
deception was political expedience, a desire to please President Johnson who, in an 
election year, kept assuring the American people that there was a "light at the end of 
the tunnel." Adams insisted that Presidential advisers were keeping the President him- 
self in the dark; it was a cruel conspiracy. And General Westmoreland, more than 
anyone else was responsible for this tragedy. As Adams testified later in a libel trial: 
We lost a war in Vietnam. There's never been an adequate investigation of 
how we managed to do it. We're a great big country and Vietnam is a little 
bitty country. 
"Vietnam was," according to Mike Wallace "Lyndon Johnson's war, but from the 
beginning of the American buildup the President placed his faith in victory on one 
man4eneral Westmoreland." Opposing Westmoreland's "good news" was, accord- 
ing to Wallace, only one man, " a lone analyst of the CIA [who] found reason to ques- 
tion the very basis of General Westmoreland's asserting that we could defeat the 
enemy. His name was Sam Adams." 
During the program the officials who supported Adams's thesis were primarily 
CIA officials. Immediately after the program was aired, two letters appeared in the 
New York Times, one by Walt W. Rostow, the other by Roger Hillsman each refuting 
Adams's thesis. CBS, however, was not alarmed until an article appeared in TV Guide 
by Don Kowet and Sally Bedell describing in detail how Westmoreland hadbeen trick- 
ed by Wallace and CBS, and how questionable techniques had been used by Crile to 
achieve the effect he and Adams wanted (Kowet, 1984). As a result CBS undertook 
its own investigation. 
The CBS in-house inquiry demonstrated how far the program had strayed from 
the glory days of Edward R. Murrow. Hardly a rule was left unbroken. However, no 
disciplinary action was taken. Congress also looked at the program. Most elected of- 
ficials are not very fond of the media and we might have expected them to usehis o p  
portunity to say a few things about fairness and objectivity. The Members of Congress 
agreed that the program was editorializing, but, it turns out, they too felt the military 
was withholding information or getting false information. 
The libel trial which began in New York City in October of 1984 took the public 
behind the scenes of CBS to see and hear at first-hand how the network creates a 
documentary. It was hardly an edifying spectacle. But the trial was important for 
another reason; it brought out the insuperable problems of trying to estimate the 
strength of a civilian guerrilla force. It is an almost impossible task which depends on 
what measures are used and on what day of the week the report was made. There was 
no more reason to believe Adams's calculations than Westmoreland's. The crisis of 
credibility was that there was no truth to be found. 
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The trial ended inconclusively when General Westmoreland withdrew his suit and 
claimed a victory, while CBS hailed the outcome as a great victory for them and for 
the First Amendment. But the public who had no reason to believe either side was left 
with the problem unresolved. Whom do you believe when you can't believe either 
side? At no point during the trial or later was any reference made to the original 
documentary and it is doubtful if reporters who covered the story had seen it. They 
could argue that they were covering a libel trial not a television program. Thus people 
in the media many of whom were critical of the Vietnam War and who may have been 
part of the anti-war demonstrations became part of a process in which Viemam 
revisionism has become our accepted view. 
Why were the reporters, editors and others so uncritical? 
The explanation for that is to be found in the culture of the media. First, there is 
a conflict of interest when journalists report on journalists. Second, journalists are ob- 
sessed with the idea that libel trials are detrimental to freedom of the press. Historians 
may conclude that libel trials do serve a useful purpose by putting people under oath 
and being able to subpoena evidence that might otherwise be erased from the tapes. 
Investigative journalism did not suffer in this instance. But media people on the sub- 
ject of libel are as unbiased as the Pope on abortion. 
In addition the journalists who covered the trial were socialized and educated by 
a generation of journalists who covered the Vietnam war and were convinced that 
despite the absence of censorship, they were nevertheless not given the truth (Hallin, 
1986). Thus, it was plausible and credible to them that the military had deceived the 
President. It did not occur to them at that time, as it did to me or anyone who had an 
elementary knowledge of statistics, that no one knew the truth. Nor did it occur to 
them, as it did to me when I went back and looked at the newspaper coverage of the 
Tet offensive that the media people were caught off guard by their own misjudgment 
of what was happening. As I have suggested many times elsewhere, the most serious 
bias of the media lies in themselves, their own subculture, their own discourse and 
own folklore. The more closely I followed the trial, the more I became convinced that 
libel cases may have a "chilling effect" on the media, but historians may look upon 
these trials as a gift. 
Hallin (1986) describes the themes of pre Tet reporting." War is a national en- 
deavour". "War is an American tradition-invocation of memory of World War 11," 
"War is manly" "War is rational", "Winning is what counts." After Tet, he says, these 
changed (Hallin, 1986, p. 175-178). But Vietnam revisionism is a war text and a return 
to that pre-Tet set: "winning is what counts". 
The urgency with which it is being foisted on us is not merely to assuage the em- 
bittered Viemam veterans, although it is that, too. It is intended to keep alive the 
paranoia, the image of an enemy. And it is a logical step in the preparation of a much 
more terrifying war text, namely that a nuclear war is winnable. Viemam revisionism 
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is not just a pro-war text; it is also a theory of history which edits the past by writing 
out of the record widespread public disillusionment, student protest, and anti-war sen- 
timent; that is, it takes history out of our hands and sees it as the prerogative of small 
elites. In this scenario we have become the refugees whose experience is being denied, 
and whose credibility is being undermined. 
The Social Responsibility of Researchers 
The problem for us who do media research is whether we are going to document this 
or resist it? 
The latter means not just exposing Vietnam revisionism and other New Right war 
texts, nor in describing how the media present the various peace movements, for peace 
movements are also seen through a military discourse. Like women who are depicted 
in androcentric scripts as being there to enhance the egos and credibility of men, the 
peace movement is presented in the language of the military and strategic theorists. It 
adds the necessary tension in a dialectical process. But it is not a form of peace dis- 
course in which militarism is the deviance. One of my fantasies is to recall all foreign 
correspondents and diplomatic correspondents and assign them to cover City Hall, 
while only pacifists, peaceniks and disarmament advocates would cover foreign 
policy, the Ottawa-Washington defense establishment and those fetal forms of World 
war m. 
Is that really so unrealistic? Some social psychologist ought to be able to con- 
struct a scale measuring "doveism" and "hawkism", and only those who score high on 
the former could cover the international scene. Assuming that is possible-and I 
believe we could simulate this set of condition- research would be different as 
well. 
As I watched Shoah I asked myself how one would go about doing research on 
i t  If we wanted to do a study of its impact on an audience and why it had credibility, 
how would we go about it? Eventually, I realized that we could not. Shoah was the 
research. It is as much about how we investigate the truth as the truth itself. And it is 
from that I deduced that those of us interested in peace discourse as an alternative to 
the texts of war must deconsauct our own studies as texts and find new, more creative 
ways of doing research, some point between the documentary and survey research, 
between art and content analysis, between analytic categories and communication. 
This enterprise begins when we stop defining our research as monitoring, as repom 
about or studies of what is or has been. We need to simulate a future and base our re- 
search on becoming. Credibility involves making choices so that if our research 
remains on a purely descriptive level, quantitative or qualitative, it may be respect- 
able, publishable but not credible. 
To summarize I have suggested here that at the present time our activities and re- 
search have proliferated yet we seem to have lost sight of the meaning of 
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communication. We acquire a certain degree of academic status but not credibility. 
And credibility, I suggested, is the key to understanding communication. One way of 
approaching this is to examine the massive denials of reality that have occurred on 
both the macro and micro scale. The holocaust is the limiting case. Recovering this 
history through the repressed memories of individuals suggests a different format 
through which it is possible to hold on to the past we denied. Just as we did not believe 
the holocaust until it was too late to save six million people, so we do not today believe 
the evidence of nuclear war. The failure of the media to speak out against the CBS 
program and its assumptions, the reflex of the media to favour the media in a libel trial, 
the habits of the media to distrust the military conmbuted to a statement of Viemam 
revisionism going unchallenged. Vietnam revisionism is not just a different interpreta- 
tion of the Vietnam war. It is itself a form of denial, a repudiation of that great wave 
of revulsion in world opinion that led to the withdrawal of American "advisers." Media 
researchers have enough distance from the media culture to recognize the bias, but we 
do not offer an alternative; under the circumstances our research must become a form 
of peace discourse. This will involve new modes of research which will automatical- 
ly be communicative. 
I recently saw a wonderful one-woman performance by Lily Tomlin called, "The 
Search For Signs of Intelligent Life in the Universe" written by Jane Wagner. In it 
Lily Tomlin plays a bag lady named Trudy who is trying to explain to a couple of aliens 
from outer space about Andy Warhol's painting of Campbell's soup can. She holds up 
a can of soup, and says, "Now this is soup". Then she points to the picture and says, 
"This is art." She repeats this many times but the two aliens are still baffled. Later and 
apropos something else they question her about "goose bumps" What are they? And 
she has a hard time explaining that, but she takes them to see a play, and while they 
are there the two aliens experience goose bumps. 
"Did you like the play that much?" she asked. 
The play? They had been watching the audiences. And they explained to her in 
language she would understand. "Trudy," they said, "The play is the soup. . . the 
audience is the art." It sums up some of my views about communication and certain- 
ly about our meeting this morning: I'm the soup; you are the art. 
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